The idea of giving up the rest of unanimity in EU decision-making processes is as reasonable as wanting to remove the brakes from a car and fear that only then will it be able to drive.
The free after further limiting case, when unanimity of the member states is required in the EU decision-making processes, for the benefit of a qualified majority, is still in the program of the European federalists. This darkness is raised by them essentially constantly, in the most diverse situations.
Recently, there has been a wave of intense pressure for such changes. It’s not just a blast from German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s speech from last week. In this way, we invite the May beasts of the Conference on the Future of Europe, building on it the proposals of the European Parliament for the revision of the founding treaties or several two initiatives of the Commission to use the so-called pasarel or hellish provisions in selected areas (on foreign policy, on general taxes, on taxes in the area of the environment and energy, to social policy).
The decision-making body expanded with each of the previous significant changes to the Single European Act, with Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, it has become the rule, where unanimity is the exception. Islands of unanimity remained only in the most sensitive areas, such as tax, anti-discrimination legislation, foreign policy, defense, social security, family law with an international element, the entry of new countries into the Union, the name of the entire financial sector or the system of the Union’s own resources.
As an advantage of Vtina’s voting system, it is easier and faster to make a decision. The flip side is that you lose control over the affected areas. the lenska state here raises its sovereign principles and becomes sovereign by name action. He must be convinced and then he is made aware of the decisions that were taken against his will and that may be in conflict with his life interests.
The search for a balance between an action-capable Union, which would not be permanently blocked, and the requirement to preserve the independence of the Polish states is certainly not trivial. There should be a weight on the issue for which the deletion of the national sentence is at all bearable, taking into account the political sensitivity of the given issue, and if there are clear advantages for which this deletion is developed.
I believe that, on the basis of this test, the internal market can be used to drain the internal market (if we interpret this term more leniently, it does not often happen now) and for very closely related issues, such as the common trade policy in relation to these countries or international first private.
On the contrary, it is inappropriate and very dangerous to abandon the national veto in areas connected with fundamental topics of internal politics and national sovereignty. Unfortunately, in the Union, there are no known measures for this. Vtinov’s ballot box was introduced in a wide range of areas, including asylum and anti-trafficking policy, criminal law, environmental protection and some aspects of social policy.
An easily accessible decision in connection with the wide-ranging and vaguely delimited powers of the Union, the expansive burning of institutions and insufficient control mechanisms creates a very dangerous combination and can be identified as one of the key factors in the centralization of European integration The EU as a community of expropriated owners and European integration in the mirror of our dreams).
The European Union is currently not in a situation where it could benefit from a qualified veto. Today, we suffer from a noticeable increase in this penetration, not a lack of it. If we succumb to this federalist pressure, we will only deepen the problems.
Thus, the end of unanimity in the common foreign and security policy of the EU would mean the end of the independent policy of the Polish states and these countries; foreign policy issues would still be decided by the main stream of the Polish states in alliance with Germany and France. The removal of the national veto in the area of taxes would have serious consequences, which would lead to tax harmonization, the removal of healthy competition between the Polish states and, as a result, less space for decision-making on key socio-economic issues at the national level. Or maybe we can find our way through various social-engineering fiscal measures, e.g. in the field of environmental protection, or the fight against climate change? Konen, we do not want to imagine how the Union would use the effort to decide the procedure in the area of social policy, or anti-discrimination legislation.
I noted on Twitter that the idea of giving up the rest of the unanimity in the EU’s decision-making processes is as reasonable as wanting to remove the brakes from a car and only then drive. We should rather work on its repairs, not on its total destruction. And we should sleep because we’re going downhill and picking up speed.