ANALYSIS: Russia is increasing the production of weapons and ammunition, but it is not enough, it lacks sophisticated weapons

The head of the Russian state defense company Rostěch, Sergei Chemezov, said last November that Russia produces 2.5 times more cannons and rocket launchers than before the war, and for some munitions, production has increased 60 times. Nevertheless, Russia was not able to gain enough fire superiority to lead to a breakthrough, even though there are five to ten Russians for each fired Ukrainian shell.

Even the increase in production did not allow Russia to fire as many missiles as in the first half of the war, when there were up to 60,000 a day, said Pavel Luzin from the Washington-based Center for European Policy Analysis. Now, Russia fires only ten thousand shells and rockets a day, despite the fact that Moscow received ammunition from Iran and the DPRK.

Russia needs to produce 3.6 million large-caliber shells a year to maintain its current rate of fire and be able to replenish its stockpiles, the CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies said this week. For a breakthrough, Russia would need to produce four million 152 mm shells and 1.6 million 122 mm shells annually, according to the Russian military.

However, the Ministry of Defense has admitted that it is capable of producing at most half of this number. It is still more than the West is producing. The EU is only able to deliver the promised million grenades by the end of this year. This year, the production capacity in the EU should reach 1.4 million per year, according to the European Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton, but part of it goes to EU countries and for export to third countries. The United States will not reach monthly production of 100,000 155 mm shells until next year. Ukraine itself started the production of 152 mm grenades only now.

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According to the Ukrainian intelligence agency HUR, last year Russia produced two million large-caliber grenades, and this year it will be 2.7 million to three million, wrote Ekonomicheskaya Pravda. Russia also has production problems, but it manages to produce gunpowder because it can import nitrocellulose from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, as well as Turkey and China. There are no factories for its production in Western countries.

The problem with heavy fire for Russia is barrel wear, which reduces accuracy and range. They wear out faster than new ones can be made. They must then be replaced with old barrels from Soviet times.

Ruslan Pushkov, who heads the Moscow-based Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, openly admitted that despite having a larger arsenal, the Russian army “does not have a fundamental advantage over Ukraine’s in artillery and ammunition.” “At least the people fighting on the Russian side don’t see it,” he added.

Russia is concentrating on the mass production of less advanced weapons and ammunition, but they are not able to gain a decisive advantage on the battlefield. This would require sophisticated weapons, but their production is complicated by sanctions that make it difficult to buy parts for drones, waiting ammunition or precision guided missiles. “The most key systems on the Ukrainian battlefield are directly dependent on sanctions,” Puškov admitted.

Therefore, Russia is reaching for systems that are not so technologically advanced, such as guided glider bombs modified from classic ones, which have great destructive power. But as Dara Massicot, a Russian military fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, points out: “When it works, it doesn’t matter if it’s technologically underdeveloped.”

Moreover, with the resumption of US aid supplies, the window for Russia to make a breakthrough is closing. Wrinkles may return to the face of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has appeared “very confident and happy” in recent months, according to someone who knows him.

Although one of the Western representatives reckons that Russia could achieve further tactical successes on the front, it will not be able to break through because its army is still not very effective with old equipment and poorly trained soldiers: “In February 2022, Russia was much better equipped and trained army. I don’t see her getting any better now. When the Russian rapid campaign in 2022 failed, Moscow switched to the old tactic of betting on quantitative superiority.”

Dara Massicotová is convinced that “aid cannot deprive Russia of benefits this year. But it will allow Ukrainian forces to defend their positions with counter-battery fire and may slow or stop the Russian advance.”

Russia is successful in recruiting soldiers. NATO’s top commander for Europe, Christopher Cavoli, told the US Congress in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia is able to recruit 30,000 troops per month, which means that there are 470,000 troops on the frontline compared to 360,000 last year. They are attracted by relatively high salaries of 200,000 rubles, which is five times the average salary in poor areas. According to Cavoli, however, the problem is the loss of experienced soldiers, as 315,000 Russians have already died or been wounded in the war.

According to Massicot, the next offensive would not be possible without additional mobilization: “If the Kremlin has ambitions to capture Kharkiv, or the south of Ukraine, which is even more ambitious, it needs to create a large force of over a hundred thousand soldiers.” Even recruiting a large number of conscripts will not solve the lack of training, Luzin said . “We talk about mobilization, but where are the commanders, lieutenants and sergeants who will command the mobilized?” asks Luzin.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, the Russians can choose from several directions for further action. However, it is not clear where the main thrust is concentrated. They can either advance west to Pokrovsk, 20 km from the breakthrough at Avdijivka, or head north from Keramik and Očeretyne and support the Russian attack on Chasiv Jar from the south. They could thus try to cut off Toreck during the attack on Kostantinivka and attack Kramatorsk and Slovyansk in a wider line.

Two Ukrainian intelligence officers, according to The Financial Times, described the simultaneous attacks along key points on the front and the rocket shelling of Kharkiv and other cities along the front as preparation for another attack. Their goal is to weaken the positions of the defenders. According to them, the offensive should begin in May or June. June is considered more likely, but this will already increase the flow of American aid, so the Ukrainians will be better able to defend themselves.

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