Commentary: The false charm of appeasement – News List

Ukraine is not winning. Therefore, it is necessary to act immediately and in the interests of the Ukrainians themselves to prevent a much worse outcome of the war. The Russian bear needs to be fed, while Ukraine needs to be starved by cutting off aid supplies. Then there will be peace.

One of the last contributions roughly in this spirit is Professor Hořejší’s article on the pages of Lidové noviny from April 19. The following lines are a broader polemic with an approach that wants (immediate) peace by stopping military support for Ukraine and “diplomatic negotiations”. At the same time, it disguises itself as realism (“lesser evil”) and – a bit arrogant – humanism (“Ukrainians must not continue to bleed, even if they stubbornly want to in defense of their own country”).

Appeasement it’s on course now. The mixture of supposed realism and humanism is pleasing. But the starting points of this approach are flawed. We should look for the path to peace, but it leads elsewhere.

No, Ukraine is not winning, and the rest of the year will be even more difficult for them. The lack of men and equipment reduces its ability to defend its positions and protect the front and the cities behind it against air attacks. This is also why the Czech ammunition initiative, if it can be brought to a successful conclusion, is so important, as is Berlin’s effort to secure more air defense systems for Kyiv.

But first of all, let’s remember that predictions of a crushing defeat and a similarly crushing victory for Ukraine, even in the educated commentary, have alternated like on a see-saw in the last two years – from the deep pessimism of the first days of the war to triumphalism and writing off Russia as a military power in the spring of the same year to doubts , that Ukraine can handle the first winter, and so on. Unfortunately, they were also prescribed to the extent of the support that the West provided to Ukraine. A good example is last year’s counteroffensive, which did not repeat the success of the one the year before that led to the liberation of Kherson – and the wave of skepticism that followed it in the West.

But now to the premises itself appeasement.

It is hard to overlook the fact that Russia does not want to act now. Why should it – at a time when it’s starting to do well, going on the offensive and looking forward to Donald Trump in the White House?

The timing just isn’t right. In addition, the idea of ​​the now negotiated peace is utopian in terms of content (“territory for peace”). Why?

First, the Kremlin’s goal is a Ukraine that is forcibly neutralized, non-sovereign and (again) subservient to Moscow. This is not primarily about territorial gains, although Crimea is of course strategically key, but about free existence any of the Ukrainian state—and its very identity, as evidenced by Putin’s public and traceable statements about Ukrainians as a nation invented by Russia’s enemies.

Secondly, in the Kremlin’s understanding, the war with Ukraine cannot be “closed” – it is essentially a universal conflict with the Western liberal world. Such a conflict may indeed end some diplomatic solution one day – but not before the Russian bear breaks its teeth. This is no pipe dream, the structural problems of the Russian economy – labor shortages, inflation, low productivity, the dependence of the state’s ability to finance war and social spending on world oil prices – are clearly visible on closer inspection and despite the current resistance to the effects of sanctions.

The growing insight into the negotiations that Russia and Ukraine conducted together in the first phase of the war does not change this much. It shows no more (and no less) than that both sides were willing to invest in negotiations and were even able to reach certain results on some, but by no means all, substantive issues. Their motivation, and especially to what extent was the investment in the negotiations tactical – and approached possible trade-offs as potentially stable and permanent – ​​but remains a matter of speculation. To be sure, the investment in the negotiations is now being returned to Moscow through manipulative narratives about how inclined it was to diplomacy, but the corrupt Anglo-Saxons ultimately scuttled the negotiations.

Diplomacy has its place in the management of relations with Russia and European security. But we should be realistic about what it can achieve. Calling now for compromises instead of proper help to Ukraine may be guided by the best of intentions. In fact, it only brings Ukraine’s defeat closer, which would subsequently stimulate further efforts by the Kremlin to spread direct or indirect influence in Europe – and let the supporters of the “closed version” of the conflict say, why would this be so despite everything we know about the Russian regime from its false speeches and actions , it should have been different. It would also lead to a deep crisis within the EU. This suits some of those calling for immediate peace today – but certainly not all.

At the same time, aid does not have to mean direct involvement in the fighting and the third world war that supporters fear appeasement, but first and foremost the delivery of what Ukraine immediately and urgently needs – ammunition, missiles and air defenses. In addition, the EU must continue to strongly support the already rapidly developing Ukrainian military production, including joint ventures with Western arms companies.

Some advocates appeasement they demand either a detailed plan leading to the defeat of Russia in Ukraine or immediate peace. This is either naively ill-informed, or – for those who know what war is and how it actually goes – possibly deliberately manipulative. By the way, exactly the same as the thesis that Russia as a great power simply has to get what it wants. At the same time, even the recent history of international relations offers several examples of great powers that lost wars even with much weaker adversaries. After all, the USA is on this list several times.

We know the basic route to peace. Now the main thing is to stay with her even during worse weather. This means persistently supporting a fighting Ukraine, as well as demonstrating the ability to defend itself and the values ​​of an open and pluralistic democratic society – including facing pressure to suppress them in the interests of “security”. And also to have a political strategy of globally marginalizing Russia and limiting its ability to wage an offensive war that would exploit Russia’s structural weaknesses. We cannot make a better investment in future peace in Europe.

Trump in the White House may surprise the Ukrainian parties in a positive way, but you can’t bet on that. Therefore, as a valid member of NATO and the EU, we must invest even more in European security than now. Time is not on Putin’s side – just as it was not once on Stalin’s. But we must not waste ours. Realism means not wasting time building castles in the air.