Ukraine continues to attack Russian warships. Most recently, although it is not yet known if or how severe the damage was, the Russian rescue ship Kommuna should have been hit.
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, Ukraine has almost certainly damaged or destroyed at least one third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet. According to Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) analyst Steven Horrell, this situation was caused by Ukraine’s ability to “think differently”, innovate and adapt.
Photo: List of News
Overview of damage to large ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. We only included large warships in it.
“Do we have missiles on the coast in NATO countries? Do we have air bases with maritime patrol aircraft such as the P-8 Poseidon? Do we have any air, surface or underwater unmanned assets?”, according to him, are the main questions that NATO should ask itself now if it wants to learn from the developments in the Black Sea.
When I talked about the situation in the Black Sea last fall with former Ukrainian naval captain Andriy Ryzhenko, he told me that Ukrainian successes are at the tactical and operational level, but not yet strategic (that is, with a noticeable impact on the course of the entire war). How do you see it now, in the spring of 2024?
I think that it is important to say that this war has been about mainland territory from the beginning, and there was an almost Napoleonic attack on the capital, on President Zelensky and the country’s leadership. It’s just obviously mainly a land war. But even if we look at it in the old-fashioned way of thinking about land war, the naval dimension remains important and affects the course of the war.
We could already see it in 2021, when Russia was amassing its forces around Ukraine. One of the important things was the transfer of landing ships from the Baltic and even the Caspian fleet to the Black Sea fleet. Russia thereby extended the threat of a possible attack as far as Odessa and tightened its grip around Ukraine from the north through the east to the south. Naval forces were an important part of this and fulfilled the strategic goal of cutting off Ukraine from the Black Sea coast.
The Ukrainians sank Russia’s flagship, which served as an anti-aircraft umbrella for the entire fleet, took Snake Island from Russia, and essentially drove the Russian Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk. Even this port in the east is threatened by the sea thanks to the newly developed surface, and I think now also underwater, vessels.
They succeeded in all this, despite the fact that Russia had a huge superiority in the number of ships, submarines and missiles ready for launch. How Ukraine has dealt with it is basically amazing to the point of unbelievable. Ukrainians innovated, adapted and succeeded. I think it is also important for the future plans of the West and NATO.
Why do you think landing ships are so often the target of Ukrainian attacks?
There will be more reasons, but I believe that the biggest factor is that they are simply easy targets – they can defend themselves worse than frigates, corvettes and patrol boats.
And the value of these ships at this stage of the conflict lies primarily in what? Is it mainly logistics, or by destroying these ships, the Ukrainians can insure themselves that there will be no landings in the future?
The main value of these ships probably lies more in their logistical capabilities. Their offensive capabilities are not sufficient for the landing on defended shores, which occurred for example in the Second World War or the Korean War, or which, for example, American modern ships have. This is not a Russian operational concept, and the Russians certainly did not use amphibious ships in Ukraine for anything like that.
They used them the most in the Sea of Azov in Berdianske before the fall of Mariuopol. By that time, however, Berdyansk had already been taken, so it was more of a landing than an attack on the beach. Even before the war started and before Crimea was annexed, we could also see landing ships of the Black Sea Fleet bringing supplies from Novorossiysk to Syria.
Steven Horrell
He is currently senior staff member of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He worked as an officer in the US Naval Intelligence Service. During his thirty years of service, he replaced several foreign missions in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe. He was deployed repeatedly at sea and at land headquarters. He retired from the service in 2021 with the rank of captain.
Photo: Steven Horrell/X.com
Steven Horrell.
In my opinion, these ships are definitely chosen as targets mainly because of the opportunity. It cannot be said that they are of any significant value to Russia. Of course, they pose a threat of landing at any place up to Odessa, or up to the border. But that’s not a very likely scenario. It will serve best for purely supply purposes. I’m telling you this from the position of a former intelligence officer with experience directly from the US Navy’s Amphibious Detachment with multiple sea deployments after 9/11/01.
You have already outlined the topic of possible lessons from Ukraine’s successes for the world’s navies. Do you see something that could be important for the future priorities of the US and China as part of their preparation for a possible conflict in the Pacific?
I didn’t mean that, for example, the United States wants to use drones in the Pacific in a similar way to Ukraine. A possible conflict with China will be a very different model. But I think that Ukraine has shown us how important it is to think differently and outside of established patterns.
The United States is already developing, and of course doing so with the prospect of potential conflict in the Pacific, unmanned surface vessels. But they are completely different from Ukrainian drones.
Ukraine uses smaller vessels that are remotely piloted, have cameras and can carry loads of explosives. These drones are mainly intended to hunt Russian ships. The drones developed by America are much larger, and the vision is that they will serve, for example, as platforms for launching missiles, or as supply vessels, they will form the escort of, for example, large destroyers. This is all a very different model than Ukraine’s use of drones.
The lesson, then, is that with innovation, even with small resources, a powerful navy can be countered. That is all?
Not at all. I think that the biggest lesson for the US and the West is related to the Black Sea region itself.
The point is that Russia had more vessels there not only compared to Ukraine, but also to NATO. It is not the case that we will cede the Black Sea to Russia. As late as 2021, the British and Dutch navies were operating there and conducting joint exercises with Ukraine. But the superiority in the number of ships, submarines and missiles on them was clear.
Turkey does have a strong navy, but mainly in the Aegean and Mediterranean, Romania and Bulgaria have small navies. Bigger powers such as the USA, Great Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands and so on are limited by the Montreux Convention. This imbalance has always been seen as a pressing issue.
The Montreux Convention
This international agreement, signed in 1936, limits, among other things, the number and size of warships belonging to states without direct access to the Black Sea that can enter the waters of the sea. In addition, those who can sail there have a limited time of stay.
The old-fashioned view of the matter points to the fact that Russia has more vessels, thus being stronger and more capable in the Black Sea. The lesson of the war in Ukraine is that it is not necessarily just about vessels.
It can also be whether we have missiles on the coast in NATO countries, whether we have air bases with maritime patrol aircraft such as the P-8 Poseidon, whether we have any aerial, surface or underwater unmanned assets. In my opinion, this is a basic lesson for the US and NATO. We should think differently like the Ukrainians and use these means to not cede the Black Sea to Russia.
What is the most important thing for Ukraine at the moment in order to continue its successes in the Black Sea?
Ukraine needs the West to supply it with long-range missiles. Largely because the crucial area is Crimea.
If the Ukrainians have longer-range missiles, they can continue to threaten it, they can, and have already done so in the past, hit naval bases, but not only that. Russia has already withdrawn most of the Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol, but I think it is important that Ukraine retains the possibility to threaten all Russian capabilities in Crimea, so for example the supply lines (which, by the way, also applies to those in Donbass) or the Kerch bridge. I see this as a key thing for Ukraine to be able to achieve victory, to end the war on its own terms, to retain its sovereignty and territory as it was recognized internationally and by referendum in 1991.
