Russia should have won a long time ago. The Americans described what the Kremlin failed fatally in Ukraine

In their nearly three hundred-page manual “Russian Tactics”, US Army analysts describe how Russia could use functional tactics in individual operations in Ukraine, but failed due to failure to adhere to its basic military principles.

The US manual ATP 7-100.1 is part of a number of other documents that deal with the military doctrines of individual states. “The tactics are gathered from Russian doctrine, translated literature and insights from recent historical events,” the document says.

But it is also emphasized in the file that the manual “is not intended to represent the way in which the Russians are currently fighting in Ukraine”. Indeed, even though armies should strive to fight according to their basic principles to guide military operations, they often do not follow doctrines.

“Many of the basic elements of this doctrine are pretty solid and could form the basis for successful operations,” Scott Boston, a military expert on Russia at the RAND Corp. think tank, told Business Insider. “But they would have to comply,” he added.

Instead of synchronized progress, Russia bet on mass

Americans gives specific examples in the manual. When a Russian brigade, for example, conducts an attack, the troops are supposed to advance in several waves of soldiers and tanks, which are synchronized with reconnaissance units, flank defense, engineers, artillery and air defense units.

“The objective is to strike hard, move quickly, breach defenses, and advance deep into the enemy’s rear. To minimize the resistance faced by the troops, attacking units should be concentrated in several columns to spread out in width and depth, disperse and reduce the effects of targeted fire on your positions,” the manual states.

The fact that Russia does not follow its combat tactics very well is also evidenced by the way in which it tried to occupy Kiev in a flash in the first days of the war. Armored columns were sent along narrow and crowded roads, surrounded, ambushed and decimated by Ukrainian artillery, drones and anti-tank missiles. This tactic cost Moscow the best pre-war troops and the best tanks and other equipment.

Even today, the Russian army does not follow the doctrine. Instead of a quick and well-coordinated maneuver with the once-vaunted air force, attacks rely on destroying Ukrainian defenses with artillery, glide bombs, or overwhelming them with large numbers of released convicts and other “disposable infantry.”

The problem is in the overall strategy

“Even attacks that are doctrinally correct can fail. But a lot of the Russian military’s mistakes come from failing to follow instructions that are in the manual for good reason. Like having guard units in front or not leaving support units without protection. That’s pretty basic stuff,” Boston explained.

Assessing the current Russian doctrine is difficult, according to a military expert on Russia, because much of it comes from the Soviet era of strictly controlled mass armies. The military reforms adopted after 2008 were therefore intended to create a smaller and more flexible Western-style force. “When that system failed them in the early months after February 2022, they reverted to older, more traditional approaches that ended up involving a much greater emphasis on mass,” Boston, a former US Army artillery officer, described.

But the problem may not be so much the Russian doctrine as the overall strategy of the war in Ukraine. Soviet plans to invade Western Europe were then based on the deployment of millions of Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops supported by vast stockpiles of weapons and materiel.

With an initial strike force of only 180,000 troops attacking a 1,000-kilometer front against a smaller but still numerous Ukrainian army, Russia could not create the mass its doctrine envisioned. Russian officials also expected – as did many Western experts – that the Ukrainian resistance would collapse and the country would be quickly occupied.

“It’s not impossible to win battles with an inflexible army, but you have to have a good plan,” Boston said. He pointed to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, when commanders hoped Iraqi forces would not put up strong resistance, but the invasion plan assumed they might.

“It would have been irresponsible for the U.S. military to do otherwise. But the Russian plan was so irresponsible in the invasion of Ukraine. Troops were ordered to move into Ukraine and occupy key locations on an aggressive schedule and without meaningful warning or time to plan so things didn’t go awry. Doctrine and training can’t do anything when you’re sent to do the wrong thing with the wrong equipment,” the military expert added.

One question will likely vex historians and military experts for years to come: Could Russia have seized Kiev – and probably won the war – in the early days of the invasion? “If Russia had made more adequate preparations, Ukraine might have noticed and reacted differently. But Russia had some significant advantages that it squandered with an initial plan and slow adaptation at some point. If Russia had tried a better plan, the situation would have turned out much better for Ukraine worse,” he concluded.